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Abstract 
 
Modern macroeconomic models with a Keynesian flavour usually involve nominal rigidities in wages 
and goods prices. A typical model is static and combines wage bargaining in the labour markets and 
monopolistic competition in the goods markets. As central policy implication it follows that 
deregulating labour and/or goods markets increases equilibrium employment.  
 
We reassess the consequences of deregulation in a dynamic model. It still increases employment at the 
fixed point, which corresponds to the static equilibrium solution. However, deregulation may also 
lead to stability loss and endogenous fluctuations. 
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1. Introduction  
Recently, Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) analysed the macroeconomic effects of regulation 
and deregulation in goods and labour markets. Their framework combines monopolistic 
competition in the goods market with wage bargaining in the labour market. In the short 
run, deregulation primarily changes the distribution of rents; in the long run this induces via 
firms entry and exit changes in employment levels.  
Their model belongs to the long tradition of macroeconomic models with a Keynesian 
flavour, which use Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic competition as a microfoundation for 
nominal rigidities and price setting power in the goods market.1 Keynesian features studied 
                                                 
1
 The widely used approach of specifying wage and price setting equations (see e.g. Nickel, 
1990; Layard et al., 1991; or Blanchard, 2003; and for empirical applications various 
 2 
in such models are the possibility of unemployment (e.g. Blanchard and Kiyotaki, 1987; 
d’Aspremont et al., 1990), wage price spirals (Blanchard, 1986) and multiple equilibria 
(e.g. d’Aspremont et al., 1995; Linnemann, 2001) and that fiscal policy has income 
multiplier effects (Heijdra and Ligthart, 1997; Heijdra et al., 1998; see also Solow, 1998). 
Typically, all these models focus on what Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) call short run 
general equilibrium – i.e. a position with a fixed number of firms in which all firms choose 
the same price and quantity and in which goods markets clear – and on the long run general 
equilibrium – a position with zero profits due to firm entry and exit. How those equilibria 
are brought about is usually not modelled explicitly, with Maussner (1992, 1996) and, more 
recently, Jin (2001) and Currie and Kubin (2002) as the only exceptions known to us. 
In particular, the transition to the short run equilibrium is not simple and obvious because 
even in equilibrium firms do not act upon a basis of knowing fully the model. Firms do not 
take into account that their decisions influence aggregate variables or that other firms may 
react. In this sense, their equilibrium pricing decisions are based on a price elasticity that is 
partial (i.e. it takes the aggregate income, the other prices and the price index as given) and 
that is higher than the one holding in the aggregate (which allows for all 
interdependencies). Given these limitations to knowledge in equilibrium, it would be 
inconsistent to assume full knowledge of the model out-of-equilibrium. This raises the 
question how the equilibrium is brought about, esp. how the equilibrium quantities are 
found. 
                                                                                                                                                     
analyses by the European Commission, e.g. McMorrow and Roeger, 2000; Bains et al., 
2002) can also be seen in this tradition. 
 3 
We suppose rational behaviour in the sense that agents hold outside equilibrium the same 
information as in a short run (or in a long run) equilibrium and act consistently. Following 
Maussner (1992, 1996) and Currie and Kubin (2002), we assume that firms know that the 
demand functions they face are iso-elastic and that they know the value of the partial price 
elasticity but that they do not know all the interdependencies of the aggregate model. In 
particular, they do not know the position of the demand functions which they anticipate on 
the basis of market positions realized in the past. 2   
We develop a model which closely follows Blanchard and Giavazzi’s (2003) set up but 
which is amended by a dynamic process focusing on the transition to the short run general 
equilibrium (and by a more explicit specification of the reservation wage). The short run 
general equilibrium solution is a fixed point of our dynamic model. However – and this is 
the main point – depending upon the parameters the fixed point may lose stability through a 
Flip-bifurcation giving rise to cyclical solutions and endogenous fluctuations.3 We show 
analytically that deregulation in goods and labour markets may lead to instability.  
The paper is organized as follows: In the second section, we present our model: 
monopolistically competitive firms bargain with unions over employment and wage rates 
on the basis of firms’ anticipated demand functions and workers’ reservation wages. In the 
third section, we explicitly add two dynamic components. First, the adjustment of the 
                                                 
2
 Jin (2001) does not confine his analysis to the Dixit-Stiglitz variant of monopolistic 
competition. In his framework, the demand functions need not be iso-elastic and firms base 
their decisions on linear expected demand functions. 
3
 D’Aspremont et al. (1995) analyze endogenous fluctuations in what they call a Cournotian 
monopolistic competition model. In contrast to our approach, the dynamics in their model 
is equilibrium dynamics, which is driven by an overlapping generations structure and 
variable mark-ups. 
 4 
anticipated demand function on the basis of realized market prices and quantities; second, 
the adjustment of the reservation wage on the basis of realized employment and wage rates. 
We show that the first process in isolation leads to diverging time paths: deregulation leads 
to instability. In the fourth and the fifth sections, we study two different specifications for 
the reservation wage adjustment, each of which mirrors a different institutional set up. We 
show that this second process may dampen the sharp instability result: deregulation may 
still destabilize the economy; however, time paths do not diverge but fluctuate following a 
period-two cycle or more complex trajectories. Some simulations complete the dynamic 
explorations. The last section is left for concluding remarks. 
 
 
2. The economic framework  
The analysis, being framed in a dynamic setting, requires dealing explicitly with time. We 
assume that during the time unit, which for expository purposes we call ‘Week t’, all events 
occur according to a well-defined sequence. On Monday of Week t, firm i and the 
associated union bargain over employment and the nominal wage rate on the basis of firms’ 
anticipated demand and workers’ nominal reservation wage. Production occurs during the 
Week from Tuesday to Friday. On Friday, commodities are delivered to the market. Market 
equilibrium determines the realized price. Finally, on Saturday firms and unions update the 
information relevant for decisions in the following period concerning the employment, the 
nominal wage rate and the realized price. 
2.1 Firms and Households 
The economy comprises a fixed number m of firms, each firm producing one differentiated 
good in a regime of monopolistic competition; and L households, which own the existing 
 5 
firms, each household supplying one unit of labour. Each firm i faces a union composed of 
i LM
m
=  members, with i = 1 … m.  
All firms share the same production technology, which involves only one input, labour, 
used in a fixed proportion.4 Assuming that during Week t firm i employs itN  workers, the 
production of good i is: 
  ( )i i it t tx f N N= =  (1) 
Household j’s preferences (j = 1 … L) towards good i are represented by a CES utility 
function: 
 ( )1 1 1
1
σ
σ σ
σ σ
−
−
−
=
 
=  
 

m
j i
t t
i
U m c  (2) 
where 1 < σ < ∞ is the – constant – elasticity of substitution between goods and itc  is the 
consumption level of good i for the period. Note that, because of the factor 
1
σ
−
m  included in 
the utility function, this specification does not represent a preference for goods variety; σ is 
a parameter related only to the market power of a single good supplier (see Blanchard and 
Kiyotaki, 1987; and also the discussion in Benassy, 1996). In Blanchard and Giavazzi 
(2003), it is the central parameter for studying the effects of goods market deregulation.  
Household j’s demand for good i is given by 
 
i
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t
t t
Y pd
mP P
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4
 Note that Maussner (1992, 1996) uses a more general production function with a variable 
marginal product of labour. 
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where Yj is the household j’s nominal income (profit income, work and non-work income)5 
and where 
 ( )
1
11
1
1 m i
t t
i
P p
m
σσ −−
=
 
=  
 
  (3) 
is the price index. Summing through j, we obtain the demand for goods i during Week t  
 
i
t
t
t t
pYd
mP P
σ−
 
=  
 
 (4) 
where Y is the overall nominal income of the economy. Taking the income and the price 
index as given,6 the partial elasticity of demand with respect to the own price therefore 
reduces to σ− .  
If the price of each good is the same, it tp p= , the price index becomes t tP p=  and the 
demand for an individual good simplifies to 
 t
t
Yd
mp
=  (5) 
in which the elasticity of demand with respect to the price is equal to 1− . 
                                                 
5
 Note that the demand decision can also be interpreted as a decision under a cash-in-
advance constraint, see below section 2.3. 
6
 We thus neglect the Price Index Effect and the Ford Effect (see Yang and Heijdra, 1993; 
Dixit and Stiglitz, 1993; and d’Aspremont et al., 1990, 1996). Linnemeier (2001) showed 
that both effects are at the root of a possible multiplicity of equilibria. We prefer to 
demonstrate our results in the simplest possible framework with a unique equilibrium. 
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Moving on to the description of the events occurring during ‘Week t’, most of our 
discussion will be devoted to the crucial ones, that is, the bargaining process and the 
determination of the market equilibrium. 
2.2 Bargaining 
As Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003), we employ the efficient bargaining model (McDonald 
and Solow, 1983; Layard et al., 1990): During the Monday of Week t the parties (firm i and 
the associated union) bargain over employment itN  and the nominal wage rate itW  for the 
current period as to maximize 
 
1i i i
i it t t t
t t
t t
W WR p WN N
P P
β β−
   
− −
   
   
%
% %  (6) 
where 0 < β < 1 represents the relative bargaining power of the unions. We assume a 
utilitarian trade union; and we observe that the CES indirect utility is given by the nominal 
income deflated by an expected price index tP%, that all profits are distributed to the owners’ 
households, and that workers not finding employment in the firm under consideration are 
expected to receive an alternative income or reservation wage in nominal terms, tWR .
7
 
Finally, itp% denotes the anticipated price for good i; i.e. the price at which the quantity 
produced is expected to be sold in the market on Friday. 
The determination of the anticipated price is crucial to our model specification. Central to 
the Dixit-Stiglitz model of monopolistic competition is that – even in equilibrium – firms 
do not allow for all the interdependencies. Particularly, in their price setting decision, they 
                                                 
7
 Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) specify the alternative income in real terms. Further down, 
in section 4, we provide a full discussion of this issue. 
 8 
do not take into account that their decisions influence aggregate variables or that other 
firms could react. They set equilibrium prices on the basis of a constant price elasticity 
equal to σ− . Given the fact that even in equilibrium firms do not act on the basis of 
knowing fully the model, it would be inconsistent to assume this knowledge outside 
equilibrium. Therefore, following Maussner (1992, 1996) and Currie and Kubin (2002), we 
assume that out-of-equilibrium firms have the same knowledge as in equilibrium; i.e. they 
know that their demand function is iso-elastic and consider the elasticity to be equal to σ− . 
However, they do not take into account all interdependencies. Consequently, firms have to 
rely on past observations of market prices and quantities to anticipate the position of their 
demand function. Each firm knows that it sold in the previous period a quantity 1ˆ −td  at a 
price 1ˆ −tp . If the firm assumes that it can sell the same quantity at the same price as in the 
previous period and that sales will react to a price change according to the elasticity of σ− , 
it will anticipate its demand function for the current period to be given by: 
 
( )
( ) ( )
1 1
ˆ
ˆ
i
t t t
t i i
t t
d p Kd
p p
σ
σ σ
− −
= =
%
% %
 (7) 
where itK  is the position of the anticipated demand function.
8
 
Using equations (1) and (7), we obtain the anticipated price itp% as 
 
1
σ 
=  
 
%
i
i t
t i
t
Kp
N
 (8) 
                                                 
8
 In the main body of the paper we present the model with naïve expectations, i.e. only 
information of the last period is used to estimate the position of the demand function; in the 
Appendix we study also a version with adaptive expectations which is more general and 
more complex but does not change the basic dynamic mechanism at work. 
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Returning to the bargaining problem of equation (6), we assume that the anticipated price as 
given in equation (8) is common knowledge to both bargaining parties. Observing that – 
consonant with the monopolistic competition set-up – the parties assume the expected price 
index tP% to be independent of their decisions, the bargaining results in: 
 
1 11
1 1
σ β β
σ σ
− +   
= = +   
− −   
i
t t tW WR WR  (9) 
 
1
i
t t tN K WR
σ
σ
σ
−
 	 
=  
 
−  
 (10) 
 
² 1 i
t tMR p WR
σ
σ
−
= =%  (11) 
Note that equations (10) and (11) are not independent results, equation (11) can be obtained 
from equation (10) by taking constraint (8) into account. 
Note in addition the familiar result from the efficient bargaining problem, namely that a 
position is chosen off the profit maximum. In equation (9), the marginal revenue is equated 
to the nominal reservation wage and not to the marginal cost (corresponding to the nominal 
wage rate). It follows that the price is set as a mark-up over the reservation wage, 
11
1σ
 
= + 
− 
%it tp WR . 
Following Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003), we interpret a decrease in the mark-up (i.e. an 
increase in σ) as goods market deregulation. It reduces the size of firm i’s anticipated rent 
per unit of output, ( ) 1 1σ − =  − %it t tp WR WR . Labour market deregulation is reflected in 
Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) by a decrease in the relative bargaining power of the union, 
β, which reduces the workers’ share in the rent, 1
1
β
σ
 
 
− 
tWR  (see equation (9)). In 
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addition, our model, as developed in the following sections, allows for labour market 
deregulation in the form of changing the unemployment insurance scheme. This form of 
labour market deregulation may also impinge on the bargaining outcome (and on the size of 
the rent) through its effects on the nominal reservation wage.  
During Week t, at the end of contracting, firm i employs itN  workers, pays the nominal 
wage rate itW  and anticipates the price 
i
tp%. Figure 1 depicts the bargaining equilibrium. 
Given the reservation wage tWR  and the position of the anticipated demand function Kt, the 
bargain determines the employment level itN  and the wage rate 
i
tW  in firm i. Each firm 
expects to sell its output at an anticipated price itp%.
9
 
 
2.3 Temporary goods markets equilibrium 
The characteristics of the goods market equilibrium follow from the symmetry assumption, 
that is, all firms behave identically. Each firm pays the same wage it tW W= , hires the same 
number of workers, it tN N= , and produces and supplies the same quantity 
i
t tx x= . They 
envisage to sell these quantities at an identical anticipated price it tp p=% %. At the end of the 
production period, on Friday, each firm supplies xt to the (identical) true demand function dt 
(see equation (5)). In contrast to the anticipated demand function, the true demand function 
takes into account the reactions of all other firms; and, therefore, it has an elasticity of 1−  
                                                 
9
 With efficient bargaining the employment level and thus the output is determined in the 
bargaining process. In contrast, Maussner (1992, 1996) assumes that output levels are 
adjusted to the demand coming forward at the set prices. This is compatible with constant 
wages and with monopoly trade unions (the cases he analyses) but not with efficient 
bargaining. See also Jin (2001). 
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(instead of σ− ). Producers cannot realize their price and quantity anticipations. In the 
following, we assume that firms sell the entire quantity produced at the market-clearing 
price ˆ tp  (different from the anticipated price).10 Using (5), the realized price is determined 
as: 
 
ˆ
t t td x N= =                     ˆ t
t t
Y Yp
mx mN
= =  (12) 
Figure 2 depicts the temporary goods market equilibrium. 
At this point in the paper, it might be worthwhile to trace explicitly the money circuit 
corresponding to the market transactions described so far. Money is only used as a means 
of transaction and its quantity, denoted by Q, is assumed to be given. On Monday morning, 
the households in their quality of firms’ owners hold the entire quantity of money. At the 
conclusion of the bargaining process, firms borrow part of it to pay the workers’ wages. 
Taking into account the unemployment benefits, part of the quantity of money is 
redistributed to the unemployed. On Friday morning, the entire quantity of money is in the 
hand of the households in the form of wages, unemployment benefits and money holdings. 
On Friday, the households’ consumption demand is determined under a cash in advance 
constraint. Market prices are therefore determined as ˆ t
t t
Q Qp
mx mN
= = ; i.e. by the pure 
                                                 
10
 In principle, producers as monopolists can also decide to sell a smaller quantity than the 
produced one when entering the market. However, they do not have an incentive to do so: 
On the basis of an elasticity of demand greater (anticipated demand) or equal to 1 (true 
demand) in absolute terms, revenues do not increase with a quantity restriction. In addition, 
at that moment, production costs are already sunk and maximizing revenues also 
maximizes profits. Therefore, quantity restrictions cannot increase profits. Currie and 
Kubin (2002) also explore an alternative quantity-rationing scheme. 
 12 
quantity theory of money. Firms receive as revenue the entire quantity of money, which 
they redistribute totally to households as realized profits, given by the difference between 
revenues and wage payments, and as debt repayments corresponding to the wages paid in 
advance.11 Therefore, total realized nominal income Y as the sum of nominal wage 
payments and realized nominal profits is always equal to the quantity of money Q; the cash 
in advance constraint coincides with an income constraint in the consumer maximization 
problem. From now on, we take the quantity of money and thus the nominal income as 
numéraire. 
Finally, on Saturday firms and unions update their information. The position of firm i’s 
anticipated demand function changes on account of the realized price ˆ tp  and the realized 
demand ˆtd . Inserting this information into equation (7) determines the position of the 
anticipated demand for the period t+1:  
 1
ˆ
ˆt t tK d p
σ
+ =  (13) 
Similarly, workers’ reservation wage adjusts in the light of the realized nominal wage tW  
and of the realized employment tN . 
 
3. The dynamic system 
3.1. Outline 
The dynamic behaviour of the model involves two processes. First, as suggested above, the 
position of the anticipated demand function (and thus of the anticipated marginal revenue) 
                                                 
11
 In order to keep our analysis simple, we assume no interest payments. 
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shifts over time. For a given nominal reservation wage and marginal revenue function, the 
efficient bargaining outcome, ² tMR WR= , determines employment. Since all firms are 
identical, equation (10) can be written as: 
 
1t t t
m
e K WR
L
σ
σ
σ
−
  
=   
−  
 (14) 
where tt
mN
e
L
=  denotes the employment rate. Taking into account equations (12) and (13), 
it can also be written as 
 ( )1 1 1t t t
Y
e e WR
L
σ σ
σσ σ
σ
−
−
−
−
   
=    
−   
 (15) 
Second, the nominal reservation wage, tWR , is also adjusted over time.  
For expository purposes, in what follows we begin our study with the dynamics of the first 
process in isolation by assuming a nominal reservation wage invariant over time. After that 
we specify the adjustment of the reservation wage explicitly and explore the dynamic 
properties of the full system. 
3.2. Goods market dynamics in isolation 
If we assume a reservation wage fixed at an arbitrarily chosen level, tWR WR= , the implied 
dynamic process is  
 ( )1 1 1t tYe e WRL
σ σ
σ
σ σ
σ
−
−
−
−
   
=    
−   
 (16) 
Equation (16) is a one-dimensional first-return map with the following fixed point and first 
derivative  
 14 
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 (18) 
As long as σ > 1, the fixed point increases with σ but loses stability at σ = 2. Equation (18) 
shows that the derivative of the first return map is negative for all values of the employment 
rate; therefore, the time path diverges for σ > 2. Deregulating the goods market increases 
stationary employment but may eventually lead to instability.  
Figure 3 illustrates the period 2 cycle occurring precisely at σ = 2. The employment rate 
alternates between e1 and e2; the anticipated demand and anticipated marginal revenue 
functions shift accordingly. Starting with the anticipated demand function 1 and the 
corresponding anticipated marginal revenue function 1 the bargaining process results in the 
higher employment rate e1. The realized market price is below the anticipated one. The 
anticipated demand and marginal revenue functions shift downward to the position 2. The 
next bargaining results in the lower employment rate e2. The market price is now above the 
anticipated one inducing an upward shift of the anticipated demand and marginal revenue 
back to their respective position 1. 
3.3. The nominal reservation wage as a function of the employment rate 
Next, we introduce a nominal reservation wage that depends positively on the employment 
rate, 1( )−=t tWR WR e : A higher employment rate is considered to increase the expected 
employment probabilities outside the firm under consideration and thus to increase the 
reservation wage. As a consequence, the adjustment of the nominal reservation wage 
affects the goods market dynamics. The resulting dynamic system is still one-dimensional: 
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The fixed point is 
 ( )
1
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Y
e WR e
L
 (20) 
Note that rising σ still increases the equilibrium employment rate 
 1 0( 1)
e e e WR
eWRσ σ σ
 ∂ ∂
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The first derivative of (19) is 
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 (21) 
The fixed point now loses stability at some σ < 2; beyond that value the time path diverges. 
Therefore, a positive influence of the employment rate on the nominal reservation wage 
destabilizes the economy. 
Figure 3 also illustrates this destabilizing effect. Start from the market result 1 and consider 
the determination of position 2. The anticipated demand and marginal revenue functions 
shift again towards their position 2; but now, in addition, the nominal reservation wage is 
increased because of the high realized employment rate e1. Therefore, the new employment 
rate 2 will be below e2 in Figure 3. The increase in the nominal reservation wage thus 
increases the fluctuations. The process is destabilized. 
3.4. The nominal reservation wage as a function of the employment rate and of its lagged 
value 
Finally we allow for a positive influence of the lagged reservation wage upon its current 
value: 
 16 
 1 1( , )− −=t t tWR WR e WR  (22) 
For the moment,12 we assume the function ( )gWR  to be monotonically increasing in both 
arguments. The rationale for the dependence of the nominal reservation wage on the 
employment rate is as sketched above; for the second one it runs along the following lines: 
a high reservation wage in t-1 will result in a high bargained nominal wage rate in t-1, 
which in turn is expected to raise the nominal reservation wage in t.  
The dynamic system is now two-dimensional and given by equations (15) and (22).  
Figure 3 can be used to illustrate that the additional effect introduced by equation (22) is 
potentially stabilizing. Start again with the market position realized in period 1 and consider 
the determination of the position 2. The anticipated demand and marginal revenue functions 
shift to their respective position 2. Two factors change the nominal reservation wage. As in 
the previous case, the high employment rate e1 tends to increase it. At the same time, the 
high employment rate e1 implies that the bargained nominal wage in period 1 was 
comparatively low. This would reduce the nominal reservation wage, thus introducing a 
stabilizing element. 
Without specifying explicitly the dynamic adjustment process for the nominal reservation 
wage, it is difficult to assess the stability properties. We provide such a specification in the 
following section and explore the dynamics of the full model. 
 
4. Fully specified dynamics and numerical simulations 
                                                 
12
 But see below the discussion in section 5.     
 17 
We model the reservation wage as the income expected by the trade union for members 
who do not find employment in the firm under consideration (see Layard et al., 1991). It 
therefore depends on the expected probability of finding employment in other firms, on the 
wage rate expected to be paid by other firms and on the unemployment benefit Bt.13 
Consonant with the monopolistic competition set up, we assume that the trade unions do 
not take into consideration reactions of other firms and the impact of their own decisions on 
the aggregate variables. The expected probability of finding employment in other firms and 
the expected wage rate outside the firm under consideration is therefore given by the 
respective values realized in the previous period.14  
 1 1 1(1 )t t t t tWR e W e B− − −= + −  (23) 
                                                 
13
 We did not incorporate explicitly the financing of the unemployment benefit. However, 
we studied the case of financing it out of a general labour income tax that applies both to 
workers and unemployed (similar to Calmfors and Johansson, 2001): Equation (6) would 
be modified to  
 ( )
1
1
β β
τ
−
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− −
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where τ%t  denotes the anticipated tax rate, with 1τ τ −=%t t . On Tuesday, the tax rate is adjusted 
to match the benefit payments required by the realized unemployment: 
( ) ( )1 1i it t t t t t t t t
i
W N W e L B e Lτ τ τ= = − −  and money holdings are redistributed 
accordingly. This extension does not change the bargaining results and the following 
analysis.  
14
 Equation (18) involves trade unions anticipating a nominal reservation wage on the basis 
of naïve expectations. In the Appendix, we explore also the case of adaptive expectations.  
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The unemployment benefit is determined by applying a fixed replacement ratio φ to the 
nominal wage rate earned in the lost job, Bt = φWt–1. 
 1 1 1 1(1 )t t t t tWR e W e Wφ− − − −= + −  (24) 
This formulation is more explicit than the one provided by Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003); 
in contrast to their specification in real terms, it comes more natural in nominal terms.15 
Using equation (9) the system (15) and (24) can be written as  
 
1
1 1t t t
Y
e e WR
L
σσ
σ σ
σ
−
−
−
    
=     
−    
 (25) 
 ( )1 1 1 11 111 1t t t t tWR e WR e WR
σ β σ βφ
σ σ− − − −
− + − +   
= + −   
− −   
 (26) 
Appendix 1 investigates analytically the properties of the dynamic system (25)-(26).  
The fixed point solutions are given by 
                                                 
15
 Note that our instability result does not depend upon this difference in specification. With 
a real reservation rate twr , the bargaining problem in equation (6) is modified to 
 
1i i i
i it t t
t t t
t t
W p W
wr N N
P P
β β−
    
−
−    
    
%
% %  
and the results in equation (11) to 1
i
t
t
t
p
wr
P
σ
σ
−
=
%
% . Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) only 
allow for a dependence of the reservation wage upon the (un-)employment rate. The central 
dynamic equation therefore is  
 ( )1 1 11
i
t
t t t t
t
p
e e e wr e
P
σ σ
σ
σ
−
−
− − −
 	  	
= =
  
 
−  
%
%   
and the derivative at the fixed point is given by 
1 1
1t t
t t
e e wr
e ewr
σ
− −
∂ ∂
= −
∂ ∂
. Thus, also in this 
case the fixed point loses stability for sufficiently high values of σ . 
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( )( )
( )( )
1 1
1 1
e
σ φ φβ
σ β φ
− − −
=
− + −
                  
1 YWR
eL
σ
σ
−
=  (27) 
They exhibit the usual comparative static properties: goods and labour market deregulation 
– as reflected in a higher value of σ and in lower values of β and φ, respectively – engender 
a higher employment rate. The analysis further shows that the fixed point is stable only for 
low values of σ and for high values of β and φ. However, in contrast to the one-dimensional 
models studied previously, the stability loss now occurs through a Flip bifurcation giving 
rise to attracting period-two cycles. Therefore, goods and labour markets deregulation – 
though increasing the stationary employment rate – may destabilize the economy, but it 
does not lead to diverging time paths. Appendix 1 also shows that adaptive expectations 
stabilize the system but the main conclusions still carry over: stability is lost through a Flip 
bifurcation; it occurs at higher degrees of deregulation and the engendered fluctuations are 
less pronounced. 
So far, we have explored analytically the dynamic properties of the system (25)-(26). We 
now turn to a small calibration exercise. Note that the fixed point solutions only depend 
upon three parameters: the parameter reflecting the degree of monopoly power in the goods 
market, σ; and the two parameters related to the extent of labour market regulation, namely 
the bargaining power of trade unions β and the replacement ratio φ. These parameters are 
subject to the following boundaries: 1 < σ, 0 < β < 1 and, 10
1
σφ
σ β
−
< <
− −
 - the latter 
ensuring a positive employment rate at the fixed point. Choosing an upper limit for σ  
therefore allows studying the entire parameter space numerically. In our exercise, we 
assumed σ ≤ 30 (implying a mark-up larger than 0.034).  
We searched for numerical values of β, φ and σ such that the fixed point approximates two 
macroeconomic stylized facts; namely that in 1990s Continental Europe the employment 
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rate typically assumes values above 0.8 and that the wage share typically assumes values 
slightly below 0.6.16 In addition, we ask which dynamic properties the time path exhibits 
close to the fixed point. Our numerical exploration shows that parameter constellations 
exist which result in plausible fixed points, which are stable for highly regulated markets 
and which lose stability with goods or labour market deregulation. With naïve expectations, 
fluctuations are typically strong and the employment rate hits quickly its upper boundary of 
one; with adaptive expectations, cyclical time paths exist with comparatively small 
amplitudes, hitting no boundary condition.  
 
 
5. An alternative institutional set-up 
In this section, we consider a different specification for the unemployment benefit  
mirroring an institutional set-up close to a social assistance scheme (see e.g. Layard et al., 
1991; and Pissarides, 1998). According to such specification, the compensation for the 
unemployed is fixed in real terms (corresponding to a certain CES utility level ω ) and the 
nominal payment is adjusted each period to the price index, 1t tB Pω −= . The unemployment 
benefit systems in the OECD countries are found in between this alternative specification 
and the one considered in the previous section where a fraction of the past period earned 
wage was assigned to the unemployed (see Goerke, 2000).  
The dynamic system now is  
                                                 
16
 Taking the average over a significant group of European Countries, Giammarioli et al. 
(2002) estimate that in the 1990s the labour share was 0.586 in the Business sector, 0.58 in 
Industry and 0.536 in the Tradable Services. 
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1
1 1
σσ
σ σ
σ
−
−
−
    
=     
−    
t t t
Y
e e WR
L
 (28) 
 ( )1 1 1
1
1 1
1
σ β
ω
σ− − −
−
− + 
= + − 
− 
t t t t
t
YWR e WR e
Le
 (29) 
A crucial feature of this system is that the realized market position impacts on the dynamics 
both through shifts of the demand function, implicit in equation (28), and through the 
determination of the nominal reservation wage, as shown in equation (29). The analytical 
structure of this specification is more complex than the one presented in the previous 
section, in which the realized market position was affecting the dynamics only through 
shifts of the demand function. Note that – in contrast to the assumption in the previous 
sections – the partial derivative 
1−
∂
∂
t
t
WR
e
 need not be positive since with the assumed 
specification a high employment rate in period t-1 not only means a high expected re-
employment probability in period t but also – via a low realized price in t-1 – a low nominal 
unemployment benefit in t. The latter indirect effect of the employment rate on the nominal 
reservation wage was not present in the previous sections. 
The fixed point corresponding to the system (28) and (29) is given by 
 
1 1
and
1
Y
e WR
eL
σ σω σ
σ β σω σ
− − −
= =
− + −
 (30) 
The major conclusions from the previous case carry over: As is shown in Appendix 2, 
deregulation in the goods market – as reflected in a higher value of σ – or in the labour 
market – as reflected in lower values of β and ω – increases the stationary employment rate, 
but may eventually lead to a Flip bifurcation of the fixed point giving rise to attracting 
period two cycles. Therefore, the basic trade off remains present: Deregulation increases 
employment rates but may destabilize the economy. Appendix 2 also shows that adaptive 
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expectations reduce local instability as the Flip bifurcation occurs at higher degrees of 
deregulation. However, this case is more complex than the previous one: Too strong 
regulation may lead to instability via a Hopf bifurcation of the fixed point which gives rise 
to an attracting circle. Figure 4a illustrates this point by means of a bifurcation diagram, 
which plots the changes in the attractor (i.e., the resting position) of the system as the 
parameter σ is varied, keeping the other parameters constant: we assume 3.63 ≤ σ ≤ 6.43, 
β = 0.35, ω = 0.67; in addition, we assume naïve expectations for trade unions and adaptive 
expectations for firms, with α = 0.35 representing the speeds at which firms revise their 
anticipations on the position of the demand function. Below σHopf, deregulating the goods 
market stabilises the system. For σHopf < σ < σFlip the system converges to the fixed point. 
However, additional deregulation may destabilise the fixed point giving rise to a stable 
period-two cycle, as σ passes through σFlip, or to a more complex dynamics, as σ is further 
increased above σ , where the system undergoes a Hopf bifurcation of the second iterate: 
the period two cycle loses stability and another stable attractor is created that consists of 
two circles. Figures 4b and 4c consider specifically the latter case for 6.35σ σ= > : Figure 
4b shows the two-part attractor and figure 4c plots a time path for the employment rate. 
Note that it exhibits a pattern much closer to the typical features of a business cycle than the 
period-two cycle after the Flip bifurcation.  
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6. Conclusion 
In this paper, we have analyzed the dynamics17 of a model that follows closely the 
prototype specification put forward by Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) combining 
monopolistic competition in the goods market and efficient bargaining in the labour market. 
The dynamics results from two sources: First, inherent to monopolistic competition is the 
assumption that even in equilibrium firms do not act upon knowing the full model. In 
particular, each supplier sets prices according to a partial demand price elasticity (which is 
higher than the value that takes into account all interdependencies). Assuming the same 
limitations to knowledge outside equilibrium, each firm will adjust the position of the 
anticipated demand function according to previous market realizations. Second, bargaining 
in the labour market is based on a reservation wage reflecting the expected income outside 
the firm under consideration. This anticipation is also adjusted in the light of realized 
market results. 
While the bargaining process may be specified in various forms, the goods market 
dynamics is directly implied by the mechanism at the core of the monopolistic competition 
model. It is difficult to imagine fundamentally different specifications without leaving the 
assumed market structure. We showed in the paper, that the first process destabilizes the 
economy: Deregulation does increase the stationary employment rate, but engenders 
diverging time paths. Introducing various plausible specifications for the adjustment 
process of the reservation wage dampens this sharp result: The stability loss occurs through 
a Flip bifurcation giving rise not to diverging time paths but to attracting period-two cycles 
                                                 
17
 We deliberately focused on the transition to the short run general equilibrium. As Currie 
and Kubin (2002) showed the transition to a long run general equilibrium does not mitigate 
the short run instability properties. 
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and eventually to complex time paths. However, the basic trade-off remains: Deregulation, 
while increasing the stationary employment, may lead to instability. 
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Appendix 1Equation Section  11 
In this appendix we examine some of the properties of the dynamic system related to the 
case in which the employment benefit is a proportion of the nominal wage rate earned in 
the lost job, Bt = φWt–1. Assuming adaptive expectations, the dynamic system is 
 ( ) ( )11 11t t tL YK K e
m L
σ
σ
α α
−
− −
 
= − +  
 
 (A1.1) 
 ( ) ( )1 1 1 1 11 11 11 1t t t t t tWR WR e WR e WR
σ β σ βγ γ φ
σ σ− − − − −
 − + − + 	   
= − + + −   
 
− −    
 (A1.2) 
According to equation (A1.1) firms update their information over the position of the 
demand function on the basis of the realised market position at the speed measured by the 
parameter α, where 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. Similarly, equation (A1.2) clarifies that trade unions update 
their expectations on the reservation wage on the basis of the bargaining outcome at the 
speed  measured by the parameter γ. 
Using ( )1 1 11t t t
m
e K WR
L
σ
σσ
σ
−
−
− − −
 
=  
− 
 the system is two dimensional in tK  and tWR .  
For naïve expectations, i.e. for 1α γ= = , the system reduces to the system as given in (25) 
and (26): 
 ( )11t tL YK e
m L
σ
σ−
−
 
=  
 
           or           ( )11 11t t t
Y
e e WR
L
σ σ
σ σ
σ
−
−
− −
   
=    
−   
 (A1.3) 
 ( )1 1 1 11 111 1t t t t tWR e WR e WR
σ β σ βφ
σ σ− − − −
− + − +   
= + −   
− −   
 (A1.4) 
A1.1 Fixed point and comparative statics 
From (A1.1) and(A1.2), we solve for the stationary values of the employment rate, the 
position of the demand function and the reservation wage  

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( )( )
( )( )
1 1
1 1
e
σ φ φβ
σ β φ
− − −
=
− + −
 (A1.5) 
 ( )1L YK e
m L
σ
σ− 
=  
 
 (A1.6) 
 
1 YWR
eL
σ
σ
−
=  (A1.7) 
 0 1e< <    iff   ( 1)(1 ) 0σ φ φβ− − − >    and   0β >  (A1.8) 
The stationary price is Yp
eL
=  and the stationary nominal wage is 1
1
W WRσ β
σ
− +
=
−
. It 
follows that the stationary real wage and the stationary real reservation wage are given by:  
 
1 1σ β σ
σ σ
− + −
= =w wr  (A1.9) 
From (A1.5) to (A1.9), the stationary state solutions depend on φ, β and σ. The comparative 
statics with respect to σ involves: 
 2 0( 1 ) (1 )
e β
σ σ β φ
∂
= >
∂ − + −
 (A1.10) 
 ( ) ( )2 2 2
1 1 11 0 0βσ σ
σ σ σ σ σ σσ
∂ ∂ ∂ − ∂ 
= − − = > = > ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ 
WR Y e w wr
e
Le
 (A1.11) 
 with   ( )0 ( ) ( 1)
WR e efor
σ σ σ σ
∂ ∂≥ < ≤ >
∂ ∂ −
 
β impacts on e , WR  and w  in the following way 
 2
1 0( 1 ) (1 )
e σ
β σ β φ
∂ −
= − <
∂ − + −
 (A1.12) 
 2
1 10 0WR Y e w
Le
σ
β σ β β σ
∂ − ∂ ∂ 
= − > = > ∂ ∂ ∂ 
 (A1.13) 
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φ impacts on e  and WR  in the following way 
 2 0( 1 )(1 )
e β
φ σ β φ
∂
= − <
∂ − + −
 (A1.14) 
 2
1 0WR Y e
Le
σ
φ σ φ
∂ − ∂ 
= − > ∂ ∂ 
 (A1.15) 
A1.2 Bifurcation analysis  
The Jacobian evaluated at the fixed point is 
 ( )( ) ( )( )
1
2
1
1
1 1 1 1
1
1
E
eL Y
m Le
J
m Y
eL Le
σ
σ
ασ ασ
σ φ φβ σ φ φβγ σ
σ σ
−
−
 	 
−
  
 
 
=

 
− − − − − − 
 
− 
−
   
 (A1.16) 
Its Determinant and Trace are: 
 ( ) ( )( )1 1det 1 1
1
σ φ φβ
ασ γσ α
σ
− − −
= − − −
−
EJ  (A1.17) 
 
( )( )1 1
tr 2
1
σ φ φβ
ασ γσ
σ
− − −
= − −
−
EJ  (A1.18) 
 with   det 0EJ−∞ < < . 
The violation of one of the following conditions would lead to instability for the system (in 
brackets the type of bifurcation involved): 
(i) ( ) ( )( )1 11 det 1 0
1
σ φ φβ
ασ γω α
σ
− − −
− = + − >
−
EJ  (Hopf bifurcation); 
(ii) [ ]1 tr det ( 1)(1 ) 0
1
σ
αγ σ φ φβ
σ
− + = − − − >
−
E EJ J  (Saddle node bifurcation); 
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(iii) ( ) ( ) [ ]1 tr det 2 2 2 ( 1)(1 ) 0
1
σ
ασ α γ σ φ φβ
σ
+ + = − − − − − − >
−
E EJ J  
(Flip bifurcation). 
Conditions (i) and (ii) always hold as long as condition (A1.8) holds. The Flip bifurcation is 
the only possible.  
We first study the case of naïve expectations in which 1α γ= = . Condition (iii) then 
reduces to 
 ( ) [ ]2 2 ( 1)(1 ) 0
1
σ
σ σ φ φβ
σ
− − − − − >
−
 (A1.19) 
Note that condition (A1.8) and (A1.19) can only hold simultaneously for 1 2σ< < , which 
therefore is a necessary condition for a positive and stable fixed point employment rate. If 
condition (A1.19) is not satisfied, the system loses stability through a Flip bifurcation. 
Figure 5, upper panel, visualizes condition (A1.8) and (A1.19), i.e. the parameter set for 
which the fixed point employment is positive and stable, for 0 35.β = . 
Analytically, the parameter set has to satisfy the following conditions (*Pos denotes the 
parameter value for which condition (A1.8) holds with an equality sign, *Flip denotes the 
parameter value for which condition (A1.19) holds with an equality sign): 
 ( ) ( )( ) ( )2 11 11 2 1Flip Posσ σφ φβ σ β σ βφ φσ φ
− −
− −
= − − < < − =  (A1.20) 
 
( )( )
( )
2 11 12 1
1 1 1
σ σσ σφ φ φ
σ β σ σ β σ β
− −
− −
= − < < = <
− + − + − +
Flip Pos
 (A1.21) 
 ( ) ( )
2
1 11 1
2 3 2 3 3 1
Flip Posφ φβ φ φβ φβ φβσ σ σφ φ φ φ
 + + + +
= + + + > > + =  
− − − − 
 (A1.22) 
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Therefore, deregulating labour and goods markets (i.e reducing β  or φ  or increasing σ ) 
eventually leads to a Flip bifurcation. 
For the general case of adaptive expectations, i.e. 0 1α< <  and 0 1γ< < , it can be shown 
that 
 ( ) ( )det 0 1;0 1 det 1E EJ Jα γ α γ< < < < < = =  (A1.23) 
 
( )det 0 1;0 1 0EJ α γ
α
∂ < < < <
<
∂
    
( )det 0 1;0 1 0EJ α γ
γ
∂ < < < <
<
∂
 (A1.24) 
 ( ) ( )tr 0 1;0 1 tr 1E EJ Jα γ α γ< < < < < = =  (A1.25) 
 
( )tr 0 1;0 1 0EJ α γ
α
∂ < < < <
<
∂
    
( )tr 0 1;0 1 0EJ α γ
γ
∂ < < < <
<
∂
 (A1.26) 
Therefore, adaptive expectations stabilize the system. 
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Appendix 2Equation Section  12 
In this appendix we study the dynamic system related to the case in which the employment 
benefit is fixed in real terms and its nominal counterpart is adjusted to the realized price, 
1ω −=t tB P . The dynamic system is 
 ( ) ( )11 11t t tL YK K e
m L
σ
σ
α α
−
− −
 
= − +  
 
 (A2.1) 
 ( ) 11 1 1
1
111
1
t
t t t t
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e YWR WR e WR
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σ βγ γ ω
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 (A2.2) 
Using ( )1 1 11t t t
m
e K WR
L
σ
σσ
σ
−
−
− − −
 
=  
− 
 the system is two dimensional in tK  and tWR . For 
naïve expectations, i.e. for 1α γ= = , the system reduces to the system as given in (28) and 
(29) 
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 
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−
−− +
= +
−
 (A2.3) 
A2.1 Fixed point and comparative statics 
Apart from the employment rate, the stationary values for all other variables correspond to 
those of the previous model; also the partial derivatives with respect to σ  and β  are as 
before. The stationary employment rate is given by 
 
1
1
e
σ ωσ
σ β ωσ
− −
=
− + −
 (A2.4) 
For further convenience note 
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wr
e
w
ω
ω
−
=
−
 (A2.5) 
If wrω <  and β > 0, then wr w<  and 0 1e< < . 
We have 
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1 ( )
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w w
ω β σ ωβ
σ σ σ ω
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= >
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− 	 
 (A2.6) 
and 
 2 0( )
e wr
w
ω
β σ ω
∂ −
= − <
∂ −
 (A2.7) 
The impact of changes in ω is given by 
 2
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ω σ ω
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∂ −
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Le
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∂ − ∂ 
= − > ∂ ∂ 
 (A2.8) 
A1.2 Bifurcation analysis 
The Jacobian evaluated at the fixed point is 
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 (A2.9) 
Its Determinant and Trace are:  
 ( )
2
det 1 1 1
1 1E
J e σ σωασ γ γ σ β ω γασ
σ σ
 	  
= − − − − + − + − 
 
− −  
 (A2.10) 
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2
tr 2 1
1E
J e σασ γ γ σ β ω
σ
 	
= − − − − + −
 
− 
 (A2.11) 
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The violation of one of the following conditions would involve instability for the system (in 
brackets the type of bifurcation involved): 
(i) ( ) ( ) ( )
2
1 det 1 1 1 0
1E
J e σ ωα γ σ γ γ σ β γ α
σ
− = − + + − + − − >
−
 (Hopf bifurcation); 
(ii) 1 tr det 1 1 0
1E E
J J
wr
σω ωγασ γασ
σ
   
− + = − = − >   
−   
 (Saddle node bifurcation);  
(iii) ( )
2
1 tr det 4 2 2 2 1 1 0
1 1E E
J J e σ ω σωασ γ γ σ β αγσ
σ σ
 	  
+ + = − − − − + − + − > 
 
− −  
 
 (Flip bifurcation). 
Conditions (ii) always holds as long as and ω>wr . 
In the case of naïve expectations 1α γ= =  (i) and (iii) reduce to 
(i) ( )1 det 1 1 0EJ eσ β− = + − + >  (Hopf bifurcation); 
(iii) ( )1 tr det 2 2 1 1 0E EJ J e
wr
ω
σ β σ  + + = − − + − − > 	   
 
 (Flip bifurcation) 
In the case of naïve expectations, condition (i) always holds; the Flip bifurcation is the only 
possible. Condition (iii) corresponds to 
 
(3 2) (4 3 ) ( 1)( ) (3 4)
0
( 1)( )
wr wr wr wr
wr wr wr
σ ω σ β σ ω σ σω
σ ω β
 	  	
− + − − − − − −   >
 	
− − + 
 (A2.12) 
In this condition for stability, the denominator is always positive. Therefore, the system is 
stable for 
 (3 2) (4 3 ) ( 1)( ) (3 4)wr wr wr wrσ ω σ β σ ω σ σω 	  	− + − > − − − −    
We may distinguish three cases depending on σ.  
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Case 1: 4
3
σ < . The stability condition is satisfied for all other parameter values:  
Case 2: 4 2
3
σ< < . The stability of the system depends upon the parameter values. There 
are three sub-cases that we have to take into account depending on ω:  
Case 2a: 3 4
3 2
wr
σ
ω
σ
−
<
−
. It follows ( ) ( )3 4 3 2 2wrσ σ ω σω− > − > . In this case, the 
stability condition is never satisfied. 
Case 2b: 3 4 3 4
3 2
wr wr
σ σ
ω
σ σ
− −
< <
−
. The system is stable for  
 
( )( 1) (3 4)
0
(3 2) (4 3 )
σ ω σ σωβ β
σ ω σ
 	
− − − − > = >
 	
− + − 
Flip
wr wr
wr wr
 (A2.13) 
If β  falls below this value, the system loses stability through a Flip bifurcation. 
Case 2c: 3 4 3 4
3 2
wr wr wr
σ σ
ω
σ σ
− −
< < <
−
. The system is stable for 
 
( )( 1) (3 4)
0
(3 2) (4 3 )
σ ω σ σωβ β
σ ω σ
 	
− − − − > > =
 	
− + − 
Flip
wr wr
wr wr
 
That is, the system is always stable. 
Case 3: 2 σ< . As for Case 2, the stability of the system depends upon the parameter 
values. Depending on ω we may identify two sub-cases: 
Case 3a: 3 4
3 2
wr
σ
ω
σ
−
<
−
. As in Case 2a, the stability condition is never satisfied. 
Case 3b: 3 4 3 4
3 2
wr wr wr
σ σ
ω
σ σ
− −
< < <
−
. As in Case 2b, the system is stable for  
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( )( 1) (3 4)
0
(3 2) (4 3 )
σ ω σ σωβ β
σ ω σ
 	
− − − − > = >
 	
− + − 
Flip
wr wr
wr wr
 (A2.14) 
If β  falls below this value, the system loses stability through a Flip bifurcation. Figure 5, 
lower panel, visualizes the stability conditions for 0 35.β = . 
Not much can be said for the general case 0 1α< <  and 0 1γ< < . The only clear-cut 
results are 
 
( )det 0 1;0 1 0EJ α γ
α
∂ < < < <
<
∂
    and    ( )tr 0 1;0 1 0EJ α γ
α
∂ < < < <
<
∂
 (A2.15) 
Therefore, reducing α  reduces the likelihood of a Flip bifurcation; in this sense it stabilises 
the system. However, in the general case, a Hopf bifurcation, which adds a destabilising 
moment to the model, is not excluded. 
Numerical investigations confirm these results. 
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